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Introduction

Age Structure

Nuptiality

Divorce

Natality

Abortion

Mortality

Migration

Population Forecast

Appendix

Bibliography

POPULATION FORECAST

In the earlier chapters of this report the changes in fertility and mortality, as well as in nuptiality, divorce and migration were looked at first and foremost as a reflection of the current developments in society. These processes can also be looked at as the starting point for changes in various important parameters of social development, such as the size and age distribution of the population. Official population forecasts are provided by the Czech Statistical Office, but there is already a tradition in this country of competitive forecasts. The Department of Demography and Geodemography of Charles University is one of the bodies which is systematically involved in making such forecasts and the fourth country-wide forecast of population development was prepared there in early 1998.

The current population forecast for the Czech republic is based on an earlier forecast from 1995 with a horizon of the year 2020. Following analysis of the most recent developments from 1995-1997, some of the original assumptions have been reviewed and the trends identified have been extended over a longer period. The 1995 forecast was based on data up to the end of 1993 and provisional data for the first nine months of 1994. It was assumed that the total fertility rate would fall to just over 1.3 children per woman in 1998 and would then rise again to 1.47 children by 2010. The anticipated fall in mortality would mean that life expectancy at birth would reach 71.0 years for men and 77.8 years for women in the year 2000 and 75.7 and 81.4 years respectively by the end of the period considered, i.e. 2020. The migration gain based on forecasts of the number of immigrants and an estimate of the level of emigration was around 4,500 persons per year.

The real level of mortality in the following three years was almost exactly that estimated but the fall in overall fertility to 1.18 children in 1996 and 1.17 in 1997 was substantially greater than that forecast. Together with this sharp drop in total fertility came a clear shift in the distribution of fertility by age. As a result the estimated development of fertility in the medium variant of the complex forecast was unsustainable and a new forecast was required. In addition to the necessary adjustments to starting figures and the adjustment of the initial age structure, the term of the forecast was shifted to 2030 and a rough estimate of developments up to the year 2050 was added, with a view to the plans for state social policy that were under discussion.

Fig. 8.1: Actual and Assumed Development of the Distribution of Fertility by Age

The new forecast was based on the classic cohort-component model of demographic reproduction. In the case of fertility the new estimates of future development were formulated on the basis of a cohort analysis. The main focus of interest was the age-specific fertility of different generations, and the expected values were corrected according to suppositions as to the changes in completed fertility and cumulative fertility at particular age levels. The forecasted cohort rates were translated into period indicators. Special attention was paid to the generations of women born at the end of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, whose distribution of fertility according to age is understood to be a transitional one representing the change from the previously prevailing reproductive behaviour to the new one. These traditional generations have been affected diferently by the recent changes in reproductive behaviour. Women who have already partially fulfilled their procreative role have reacted differently to the changed conditions than have those who have not yet had a child. By a consistent application of the cohort approach it was possible to include predictions on changes in the behaviour of subsequent generations of women into the forecast of the level and distribution of age-specific fertility rates.

A comparison of the actual curves for fertility showed that the changing distribution of age-specific rates came in two phases. The first phase, 1990-1996, showed a sharp drop in fertility rates in almost all age groups, with the highest rates in the lower third of a woman's childbearing age. The inequalities in this drop came with the rise of the age of maximum fertility (the modal age), which however continued unabated even after the fall in the overall fertility rate stopped in 1997. This can be interpreted as the beginning of the second phase, in which overall fertility will remain unchanged or will rise, while age-specific fertility rates of older age groups will increase and with them the modal and average age of mothers at the birth of a child. The decisive factor in the timing and rate of changes in fertility over the next few years will be the level and timing of the children that the generation of women born in the 1970s have put off having. Over the last nine years this postponement has resulted in an accumulation of reproductive potential which must be at least partially realised in the coming years. At the same time, it was assumed that some factors limiting reproduction, primarily the appearance of new opportunities for personal fulfilment and for a career for young people, will become less important, and this would lead to an increase in today's very low level of overall fertility. The full stabilisation of the basic features of fertility and its development can be expected some time in the next 10 to 15 years. This horizon takes into account the actual boundary between putting off having children and deciding not to have them for the generations of women now entering the traditional peak age of fertility, that is for the generations which make the greatest contribution to the major fall in fertility.

The continuing stabilisation of the principle trends in the development of mortality as seen in the first half of the 1990s made it possible to use the parameters of the 1995 forecasts without any major alterations. The only adjustment needed was related to the changes in older age groups, where the improvement of mortality conditions is faster than expected. These corrections had a greater effect on female mortality than on that of men, meaning that the predicted difference in life expectancy between the sexes was increased, which in some degree lessened the originally assumed approximation of these indicators. The changes were based on a detailed analysis of mortality according to sex and age, predicted changes in the general state of health and changes in mortality rates by cause, and last but not least on an analogy with the changes in mortality in some other European countries. The forecast itself was made in terms of the probability of death between two exact ages, with the aggregate indicators acting as control parameters - life expectancy at different ages and the contribution of selected age groups to the change in life expectancy at birth.

The question of migration presented greater difficulties than did those of fertility and mortality. Not only are there considerable shortcomings in Czech statistics on foreign migration, but migration is also influenced by a whole range of factors which it is difficult to predict. The ultimate pattern of external migration will depend greatly on legislative changes affecting the moves of people across state borders in Czechia and the surrounding countries, on how these are implemented, and by no means last on the overall political, economic and social situation in individual countries of Europe and indeed of the world. While the 1995 forecast used a single set of predictions relating to foreign migration, the 1998 forecast used three variants which differ primarily in the size of the migration balance, while the age structure of immigrants and the distribution of emigration by age follow the actual levels in the first half of the 1990s. The first scenario used in calculating the medium variant produced a rise in the positive balance from the estimated starting figure of around 5,000 persons to 10,000 persons in 2005 following by a stabilisation. The high variant calculated on the balance continuing to rise until 2015, when the migration gain should reach around 16,000 persons per year. The low variant produced a very different picture, with the Czech Republic's attractiveness for migrants falling and the positive balance changing into a negative one in the first ten years of the forecast period, a continuing increase of the migration loss to around 2,000 persons per year and its stabilisation at this level after 2015.

A selected combination of forecast values of the parameters of reproduction to the structure of the population at the beginning of 1997 were applied within the framework of the classical cohort-component prediction model. Forecasting in one-year steps provided the expected number of inhabitants by sex and age group and in addition gave the expected number of demographic events. The results show that deaths are likely to exceed births throughout the forecast period. Only the high variant anticipated an interval of 10 to 15 years with a certain but relatively small probability of a slight increase in the natural change. The nature of overall reproduction in the first 10 to 15 years of the next century is likely to be decided by the level of migration gain. After 2020, however, the existing irregularities in the age structure of migration do not provide much reason to hope that migration will influence the overall balance of population development, even with the expected low level of mortality, increased fertility rate and increased migration gain. That period is likely to see a definite trend towards depopulation which, under certain circumstances, could become permanent. Up to 2020, however, the fundamental changes will be rather on the level of the structure of the population rather than its total size, although this does not mean that these changes will be insignificant. From the point of view of the overall development of society, the distribution of the population by age and sex is more important than its simple number.

For virtually the whole time period forecast, the fundamental and irreversible feature of population development in the Czech Republic will be the progressive ageing of the population, very probably followed by a definite and long term fall in the total number of inhabitants. With these developments, certain irregularities in the current age structure will lessen or disappear. The large indent resulting from the very low rate of fertility during the first world war will disappear, followed by the dent due to the low number of births in the second half of the 1930s. There is unlikely to be a new major irregularity following on from the population boom of the 1970s, something which has been more or less taken for granted for the last twenty years. The reproductive behaviour of women in the different generations of this period is so heterogeneous that some cohorts are showing a bi-modal distribution of age-specific fertility rates. The expected reduction in excess male mortality and the constantly higher percentage of men among foreign migrants mean that as well as an overall ageing of the population, there should be a slight decrease in the relative predominance of women.

The tempo and extent of the ageing of the population is decided primarily by the irregularities in the age structure, although the significant drop in mortality rates in older age groups will also be an important factor. The ageing of the population, seen as the rise in the percentage of people over the age of 65, will initially be gradual as relatively small generations pass the age of 65, but after 2005 the larger numbers of people born after 1940 will join them, accelerating the ageing process. The rate of this process will probably not reach a peak with the arrival of the post-war population boom, since all three variants of the new forecasts show it continuing due to the fall in the number of births.

Fig. 8.5: Expected Age Structure of the Population in 2030 (medium variant)

The number and percentage of children in the population, which is falling rapidly at the present time, is unlikely to change greatly between 2005 and 2020 since the next ten to fifteen years will probably see a similar number of children born each year as in the second half of the 1990s. A new fall in the number of births after 2010 however, is likely to be the start of a lasting decline leading to a reduction in both the number and percentage of children.

The irregularities in the age structure at present and the small size of future generations of births also indicate a change in the number and age structure of people of working age (15-64 years). In the period up to 2005, when the relatively small number of those born in the second half of the 1930s will make way for the larger generations born in the 1980s, we will see a continuing growth of this age group as part of the population as a whole, in both absolute and relative terms. Immediately after 2005, however, there will be the start of a continuing decline, since the large numbers of people reaching the age of 65 will give way to smaller and smaller generations.

The number of people over the age of 65 is expected to increase, due both to the shift of the larger generations up the age pyramid and the improvement in mortality conditions in older age groups. The annual increase in the number of people over the age of 65 should initially be around 10-20,000, but between 2010 and 2015 this increase could rise to between 50,000 and 60,000 per year. Over the next twenty years this will increase the number of retired persons by half against the background of an unchanging or slightly decreasing number of inhabitants. The result of the change in the age structure of the population in Czechia will be a rise in the index of economic burden, when the ratio of people over the age of 65 to those aged 15-64 will rise from its present level of less than 1:5 to about 1:4 around 2012, to 1:3 by about 2020, and by 2030 to the hardly conceivable figure of 1:2.6. At the same time, the development in the real burden on the economically active segment of the population will be even more dramatic than the rise in these indicators, even though the retirement age is due to rise by two months each year for men and four months for women, so that by the year 2007 it will stand at 62 years for men and 59 for women, according to the number of children they have had. It is also likely that the retirement age will continue to rise after 2007 to reach 65 years. Even though the retirement age is being raised gradually, this is a very sensitive issue, both politically and socially, and it cannot be assumed that the rise to the age of 65 will come soon. The experience of other countries and the Czech statistics on retirement, however, show clearly that the real retirement age is considerably lower than the legal one, particularly when unemployment is high.

Similar changes to those for the index of economic burden can be expected for the index of ageing, which indicates the ratio of people over 65 to the number of children. This is certain to continue to rise rapidly so that by about 2007 the Czech Republic should have approximately equal numbers of children and elderly people. The percentage of older people will continue to rise rapidly in the following years and by 2030 there will probably be twice as many people of retirement age as children aged 0-14.

The expected extent of the changes in the age structure of the Czech population has no analogy in the modern age and it is difficult to imagine all the possible consequences. Falling natality and the consequent decrease in the number of children will continue to have an important influence on the development of the education sector, principally on the number and size and in some areas the siting of schools and pre-school facilities. The much reduced number of children will also affect the health sector and will entail a major reorientation of various types of goods and services. The falling numbers of children and young people preparing for their careers against the background of the developing private sector in secondary and tertiary education will bring the competition in this important socio-cultural sphere to a head.

The rising number of retired persons and the even faster rise in the number of people over the age of 80 will place unprecedented strains on health care and retirement insurance in their present forms. It is not difficult to deduce that in the near future expenditure on health care and particularly on pensions will rise at such rate that the system will collapse unless it is radically changed. The economic burden on the economically active population will have to increase since it will involve not only direct taxation and contributions to state funds, but also indirect taxes, individual expenditure on health care, for every day health and social care for elderly or ill people in the family, and by no means least the costs of personal pensions. Changes in intergenerational relations and in the organisation and functioning of society as a whole will be extremely important in this situation.

The size and rate of the anticipated developments in demographic structures were largely based on the past situation and on the changes in reproductive behaviour during the period of social transformation. Some factors of future population development cannot be changed as they are based on the existing age structure, but others, particularly those relating to future changes in fertility rates, can to some degree be affected by social policy. It is important to take both the actual and the probable increases of the anticipated population development into consideration and to bear them in mind in all economic and social forecasts.

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